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The philosophical category of category mistakes is a mistake about 
categories. 
—Paul Thagard (2009) 
1. Kinds of Naturalized Philosophy 
It has become commonplace to trace the beginnings of contemporary 
naturalism in philosophy to Quine’s essay on naturalized epistemology 
(1969). As in all clichés, there is some truth to it, but reality is much more 
complicated. One could trace not one but two kinds of naturalism in 
contemporary philosophy to Quine. And, what is more, there were 
philosophers who practiced naturalized philosophy much earlier than 
Quine. It would be apt to say, therefore, that naturalists returned to the 
mainstream when the proponents of the linguistic turn found themselves in 
a cul-de-sac (Kitcher 1992). 
Even so, returning to Quine’s manifesto is still very useful. It allows us 
to disentangle the two kinds of naturalism that sprung from it which makes 
it possible to clarify which kind of naturalistic approach is taken by the 
authors of the chapters included in this volume. 
The first kind of contemporary naturalism is interested with reducing 
all knowledge to something fundamental, be it fundamental physics or 
sensory stimuli. Such was the attitude of logical positivism whose heritage 
is quite clearly visible in Quine’s thinking. In particular, when Quine 
proposed naturalization of epistemology, he did so because of the miserable 
failure of the effort to logically derivate all theories from sensory 
experience. Instead of showing how all theories follow logically from 
sensory stimuli (or rather from sentences associated by reinforcement with 
certain sensory stimuli), we should look at the causal processes by which 
theoretical knowledge is built from sensory stimuli. 
Introduction 2 
Even if this kind of program may still sound plausible to many 
philosophers today, it is not naturalistic in the second sense of the word 
explored here. Namely, it takes for granted that knowledge is indeed based 
on sensory observation, and that epistemology should be busy with showing 
how sensory stimulation becomes theoretical knowledge. Unfortunately for 
Quine, however, this is just a dogmatic assumption. As Fodor forcefully 
argued, experimental science does not require that empirical evidence stem 
from sensory stimuli at all (Fodor 1991). We may easily replace a human 
being, whose sensory abilities are quite limited, with a machine taking 
measurements, and the experimental evidence is no less empirical for that. 
You don’t need qualia or whatnot to make evidence more observational 
than it already is when measured by an automated system. Fodor, in 
developing a program within this second kind of naturalism, simply finds 
no place for dogmatic empiricist assumptions when theorizing about 
knowledge. Instead of making such assumptions about empirical knowledge, 
we should look at how science really proceeds. 
Notably, however, even the kind of naturalized epistemology that did 
rely upon these dogmatic presuppositions went further than many of 
today’s ‘naturalist’ philosophers would ever want to go. This is because 
there is yet another kind of naturalism – should we say a ‘deflationary’ 
one? – that conflates naturalism with ontological physicalism. Instead of 
showing how knowledge (or some other philosophically relevant 
theoretical entity) is brought about by processes that are empirically 
investigable, it is busy with creating theoretical frameworks to describe the 
relationships between such entities and ‘the physical’, where ‘the physical’ 
is usually either left almost completely without any content, or equated 
with the view that the fundamental cement of the universe are some 
physical entities. These entities are usually couched in a terminology that 
suggests that they be elementary and atomic rather than relational. (That 
the latter view, presupposed for example by Jaegwon Kim in most of his 
writings, is hardly part of contemporary physics, barely needs mention; cf. 
Ladyman, Ross et al. 2007.) 
So, to sum up, we may distinguish three kinds of naturalism: (1) the 
one that uses science to argue for philosophical positions even if they are 
clearly at odds with what science says or does; (2) the one that sees 
science and philosophy (along with the humanities) as belonging on the 
same continuum, and that does not seek for strict boundaries between 
those; and (3) the one that is just a new label for physicalism. 
Since it is the second kind of naturalism that is of most relevance to the 
authors included here, it makes sense to elucidate it a bit further. It should 
be clear that this naturalism is a methodological position rather than  
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defending any particular ontological claim. It is also not focused on purely 
philosophical questions, such as showing how physicalism or empiricism 
is true by citing scientific papers and textbooks, or performing spectacular 
thought experiments about a future, ideal and complete fundamental 
physics. Rather, it is interested in the real subject matter of science, so it 
takes science most seriously in allowing that scientific discoveries lead to 
conceptual revolutions. Notably, it may also point to conceptual conundrums 
in science that seem to stem from philosophical assumptions or address 
worries connected with philosophical problems that seem pertinent to 
scientific theories, such as the worry whether causal explanations are 
genuine in a certain domain or whether some entities, say mental, are 
causally efficacious for certain phenomena. But these worries and 
conundrums are of common interest for philosophers and scientists alike. 
In effect, this brand of naturalism does not posit any abrupt discontinuity 
between scientific knowledge and philosophy.  
In philosophy of science, this kind of approach is attributed to Kuhn 
(1970) and pioneered by Fleck (1979), who insisted on investigating the 
practice of science instead of proposing rational reconstructions of the 
logic of inquiry. Most philosophers of science have followed suit (for a 
pluralistic view on naturalized philosophy of science, see Callebaut et al. 
1993.) Some have developed Kuhn’s (1970) historical methods while 
others have turned to a cognitive approach to understanding science (e.g., 
Giere 1994, Nersessian 2008). Both the historical and cognitive 
approaches agree that naturalistic philosophy of science should not restrict 
itself to looking at the products of science–journal papers, books, reports, 
models or whitepapers–but must consider science as a process. It is not 
only important to consider whether theories are properly justified but also 
to think about how those theories come into being. By looking at how 
discoveries are made, we may improve our understanding of such 
important issues as how the research heuristics of localization and 
decomposition make possible certain kinds of reduction (Bechtel and 
Richardson, 1993). Or we may simply help improve research strategies. 
Research into discovery in science belongs to the tradition initiated by 
Herbert A. Simon and his collaborators (see, for example, Langley et al., 
1987), and its influence on many subsequent philosophers of cognitive 
science and neuroscience is beyond doubt. In particular, the mechanistic 
philosophy of science (Darden, 2006; Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2008) 
follows in Simon’s footsteps by investigating the scientific heuristics 
employed in the identification of mechanisms; but you don’t have to focus 
solely on mechanisms to talk of the importance of heuristic methods 
(Wimsatt, 2007). At the same time, this kind of philosophy of science is 
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deeply entrenched in philosophy of biology, where evolutionary theory 
supplies the conceptual framework. 
This volume is intended to be an exercise in this kind of naturalism, a 
naturalistic philosophy that does not need to be naturalized further because 
it is methodologically naturalist. In particular, in theorizing about the 
mind, the discussion is not focussed on traditional topics of the philosophy 
of mind, such as finding aprioristic arguments showing that it may be 
logically possible to reduce future psychology to future complete physics. 
Fascinating as such arguments are, they are often of secondary interest to 
people who want to know something about how minds work, what they 
are, and how best to investigate them. We do not wish to suggest that all 
philosophy of mind is futile scholasticism to be replaced with science, so 
long as there remains a distinctive role for philosophers of psychology and 
cognitive science to play. This statement calls for some elucidation, so it 
makes sense to see what would be the point of such a wholesale, radical 
rejection of philosophy of mind. 
The philosophy of mind is over. The two main debates in the philosophy of 
mind over the last few decades about the essence of mental states (are they 
physical, functional, phenomenal, etc.) and over mental content have run 
their course. Positions have hardened; objections are repeated; theoretical 
filigrees are attached. These relatively armchair discussions are being 
replaced by empirically oriented debates in philosophy of the cognitive and 
neural sciences (Chemero and Silberstein, 2008, p. 1). 
But Chemero and Silberstein are clearly wrong. For example, the debate 
over mental content is not over at all, but is still as fierce as ever (Ramsey, 
2007). Admittedly, for Chemero, the arch-antirepresentationalist, this debate 
is best swept under the carpet but it is a gross simplification (if not 
distortion) of the practice of cognitive science to say that representations 
do not play any role at all in cognitive explanations. They do. And we still 
do not understand what that role is, exactly. Similarly, the discussions over 
functionalism, and especially about reduction, multiple realization and 
causation are very much relevant both for today’s philosophy of mind and 
philosophy of psychology (see, for example, Shapiro, 2004 or Polger, 
2004). So while it might be true that re-focusing the debate on the goals of 
the scientific research into mental capacities should render the debate more 
concrete than in the past, when it relied on intricate thought-experiments, 
this does not make the whole field of traditional philosophy of mind 
irrelevant to naturalistic philosophy. 
Paul Thagard (2009) gives at least two reasons why philosophy is 
relevant to cognitive science, and they apply to philosophy’s significance 
for psychology or any science, for that matter. Firstly, philosophical 
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thinking in the context of science remains at a higher level of abstraction, 
or generality, which makes it easier to discover commonalities that would 
have been occluded by narrow specializations. This is particularly 
important in interdisciplinary conglomerates such as cognitive science, 
where merely verbal disputes are bound to arise because of the differences 
in terminology in various fields. Secondly, philosophers are skilled in 
normative arguments, and when science meets practical application–
especially in the fields where practical advice is sought, such as psychiatry, 
neurosurgery, economics, or educational policy–philosophers are able to 
clear up the ways norms may be inferred. For example, instead of 
presupposing a traditional model of ideal rationality exemplified by homo 
oeconomicus, naturalistic philosophers may also link practical applications 
with the idea that human beings are merely satisficers. 
Philosophical ‘therapy’, sermonized by late Wittgenstein and his 
followers, that aims to remove philosophical or metaphysical vestiges 
from science by declaring them meaningless, is itself quite meaningless 
for scientists. The trivial empirical observation that in some natural 
language words do not mean the same thing as in the technical vocabulary 
of science is of hardly any importance. Neuroscientists, for example, use 
the intentional idiom to talk about brain parts, and Wittgensteinians think 
that this is a serious category mistake, as only persons may be ascribed 
intentional capacities. The argument is that in natural language we don’t 
say so. As this is an outright falsity: it takes little effort to see that people 
frequently say, for example, that one eye sees a slightly different image 
than the other.1 Of course, one could interpret this kind of utterance as an 
abbreviated form of the correct “a human being sees with one eye 
differently than with another,” and paraphrase similar utterances in the 
same way. Otherwise, this frequent talk would be a category mistake, as it 
is only the whole person that sees. However, the mere fact that one would 
need to paraphrase–and in the way that is so prolix as to make such 
paraphrase sound artificial–means that what is at stake is not ordinary 
language but a certain kind of regimentation of natural language into some 
kind of theoretically-laden talk. The language usage is simply different, 
and the biographical observation that (some) Wittgensteinians do not 
consider frequent English usage as standard, preferring hypercorrection 
over standard usage, does not justify the claims about category mistakes. 
                                                 
1 If still in doubt, see for example Corpus of Contemporary American English, 
available online at http://corpus.byu.edu/ (Davies 2008). The query “person sees” 
has 53 matches, “eye sees” has 54 (you might also add “eyes see” with their 67 
matches, and “persons see” with 1 match). The Google Books Historical Corpus 
allows investigating the changes in usage on the same website. 
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Wittgensteinians are free to talk whatever way pleases them but it is not a 
philosophical argument for others to change their language. There is 
nothing special in (a hypercorrect flavour of) ordinary language that would 
make it a privileged source of insight. The theoretically-laden paraphrase, 
in other words, has to be justified, and mere linguistic facts do not support 
it. 
For a similar reason, Thagard argues that supposed category mistakes 
such as this are just the figments of philosophical imagination: concepts 
change and are not set in stone once they occur in ordinary speech. So, 
concepts are not something that you could analyze to gain philosophical 
insight into how things are (Fodor 1998); at best, you get lexical 
semantics. Indeed, the very category of ‘concept’ may not be as unified as 
philosophers usually presuppose (Machery 2009). 
At the same time, it needs to be stressed that some of Wittgenstein’s 
insights turned out to be useful in the scientific investigation of prototype 
concepts. In particular, the notion of family resemblance was put to use 
there (Rosch & Mervis 1975). And, maybe ironically in this context, the 
Wittgensteinian insistence that the task for philosophers is to clear up 
conceptual confusion is still valid; but, this time, it is to clear up the mess 
that the Wittgensteinians themselves introduced by sermonizing that 
common sense is the measure of all things. For this reason, naturalists 
often engage in polemics with non-naturalized philosophy. We will see 
examples of that in this volume as well.  
All that we have said up to this moment is not to be meant to imply 
that naturalistic philosophy of the kind that is pursued here is supposed 
only to serve the needs of science. There are distinct philosophical 
interests that naturalists take in their reflection that crosses the boundaries 
between the scientific and manifest image of the world. For example, for 
Daniel Dennett (2009) this is one of the tasks for philosophy of cognitive 
science: to understand the impact of new findings on the self-image of 
human beings, and help draw a broad, rational picture of the world. This, 
however, does not mean that the manifest image be replaced with some 
particular special science; we do not need scientific standards in everyday 
life, and for this reason we will satisfice by taking into account only the 
most crucial insights that science provides. 
2. From Naturalized Philosophy to Naturalistic Thinking 
There is a second reason why we opened this introduction with a quote 
from Quine. Some of the early versions of the papers in this volume were 
presented during workshops in Kazimierz Dolny, Poland that we have 
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organized over a number of years, and a certain kind of dualism that seems 
to correspond to the two kinds of naturalism discussed above is reflected 
in the names of these workshops. Just like Quine, they started out as the 
Kazimierz Naturalized Epistemology Workshop (KNEW) back in 2005. 
After some time, roughly at the point when we decided that there was 
enough material about normativity to think of editing a volume about it 
(which appeared as Miłkowski and Talmont-Kaminski, 2010), we retained 
only the acronym, as we felt that epistemology was already successfully 
naturalized. The unofficial expansion was Kazimierz Naturalized Everything 
Workshop, while the official one – Kazimierz Naturalist Workshop. We 
wanted to stress that we are no longer so much interested in meta-
philosophical reflection about the status of naturalism as in the real work 
done. 
Because many of the participants of the workshops have decided to 
come regularly, we believe we can say that there is something that brings 
them together; this is exactly the second kind of naturalism, as described 
above. For the present volume, we asked some of our regulars to 
contribute chapters related to naturalistic approaches to the mind. 
In the first section, the sciences of the mind are investigated as process, 
not as product: in other words, the authors focus on discovery rather solely 
on justification strategies. Marcin Miłkowski frames some of the 
simulation research in cognitive science and cognitive robotics in terms of 
“reverse engineering” and shows what light it sheds on the practice of 
cognitive investigation. The heuristics used to reverse-engineer a piece of 
software correspond quite strongly to the best practice in cognitive 
modelling. Samuli Pöyhönen, in turn, focuses on how the mental 
mechanisms of such complex phenomena as bulimia nervosa, which are 
partially socially constructed, could be still understood as natural kinds. 
He concludes that the notion of the natural kind, if used to discuss 
explanatory practices, should be relaxed as to include cultural factors as 
well. Finally, Mark Alfino shows that investigating the mechanisms that 
underlie the phenomenon traditionally called wisdom may be beneficial 
not only for psychology but for philosophy as well. This is because, if we 
are interested in improving our epistemological practices, we better look at 
what wise people do and how their expertise is explained by current 
psychological research. 
In the next section, Biological Cognition, three chapters were included. 
Alvaro Moreno argues for understanding cognition as a biological 
phenomenon, and in particular one that occurs in autonomous systems 
capable of recursive self-maintenance. Cognition considered this way can 
no longer be reduced to abstract logical or computational capacities of the 
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mind. Paweł Grabarczyk focuses on the difficulties with applying 
psychological vocabulary to non-linguistic animals in order to explain 
their behaviour. Indeed, he argues, by drawing on numerous examples 
from ethology as well as on purely philosophical considerations, there are 
immense difficulties with justifying, for example, the claim that animals 
perceive something as belonging to one ontological category rather than 
another. And Benoît Dubreuil presents research he has been conducting in 
recent years on a topic that has been neglected by cognitively inclined 
philosophers and social scientists: the evolution of political hierarchies in 
humans. Why do humans live in political systems as different as small 
egalitarian foraging bands and large-scale hierarchical societies? His view 
is that cognitive sciences are essential tools that help making explanations 
in the social sciences deeper, but that they only reveal their full potential 
when they are used in conjunction with more traditional methods of social 
research, as part of an integrative and pluralistic approach to complex 
social phenomena. 
The third section, Realisation, Explanation, and Reduction, focuses on 
another set of issues. Naturalists often see traditional reductionism as too 
far removed from scientific practice. Instead of arguing for autonomy of 
special sciences by declaring them irreducible, Markus Eronen uses the 
notion of robustness, as defined by Wimsatt (2007), to defend the view 
that entities used by special sciences are real as long as they are robust, 
i.e., presupposed by multiple independent theoretical frameworks. In this 
way, he naturalizes the traditional non-reductive physicalism without 
being committed to any a priori dogma. In particular, Eronen rejects the 
traditional argument from multiple realizability. In contrast, Panu Raatikainen 
argues conditionally that even when one accepts that there is multiple 
realizability, the argument that the mental cannot be causally efficacious is 
faulty. In particular, the causal exclusion argument, voiced most 
powerfully by Jaegwon Kim, cannot be sound if one accepts the 
interventionist account of causation, which has been successful in 
analyzing causal claims in science and dealing with traditional difficulties 
of theories of causation. Raatikainen defends, in effect, the view that it is 
possible for the mental to be causally efficacious without committing 
oneself to type identity or similar reductionist views. Witold Hensel, on 
the other hand, shows that many naturalists are careless when arguing for 
anti-reductionism. As it turns out, Craver’s (2007) mechanism, his 
declarations notwithstanding, is best understood as a reductive framework, 
not as an anti-reductionist one.  We think that these three papers show a 
range of different approaches to reductionism in contemporary naturalism. 
The debate is far from over. 
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Section four, Metaphysics of Mind Naturalized, contains papers that 
target the traditional metaphysical issue of qualia or phenomenal 
consciousness in the philosophy of mind. Jonathan Knowles argues for a 
version of naturalism in which the hard problem of the phenomenal 
consciousness does not arise, as what the organism cognizes, however 
basically, is always already a world for it, filled in and specified in 
relation to categories that only make sense in relation to its particular 
subjectivity and needs. Tadeusz Ciecierski tries to pin down the traditional 
claim that qualia are intrinsic properties and investigate what its 
consequences are. As it turns out, in conjunction with the claim that there 
are so-called object-dependent thoughts, the traditional notion cannot be 
consistent unless accompanied by some form of direct realism or direct 
reference thesis. This is a quite surprising corollary of a widespread view. 
Dimitris Platchias, in turn, argues that the challenge posed by David 
Chalmers (1996) against non-dualists may be answered in terms of the 
HOT theory of consciousness. 
The last section is devoted to naturalization of truth and correspondence. 
Jaime Gomez presents a vindication of a naturalised theory of concepts, 
linked with an isomorphism-based notion of correspondence. In contrast to 
traditional accounts of correspondence, he acknowledges that a role for 
model-like representations in autonomous cognitive systems has to be 
shown. Krystyna Bielecka analyzes deflationary strategies as implying 
certain supervenience claims to show that they are either uninformative or 
implicitly inflationary. Even if she focuses only on Hartry Field, this 
argument seems to be generalizable to linguistic deflationism as such. 
Maria Frappoli, focuses on the enterprise of naturalizing truth, especially 
on the so-called prosentential theories of truth. For this reason, she gives 
more naturalistic ground to positions close to deflationism (if not 
deflationist per se). 
As is, we hope, clear, the volume shows a lively debate between 
different positions in contemporary naturalism. Eronen and Hensel 
disagree about the role of reductionism, Frappoli argues for an essentially 
linguistic (prosentential) account of truth, while Bielecka argues against it; 
Gomez defends an account of representation as isomorphic encoding 
which is rejected by Moreno. A convergence of opinion is to be found in 
dead alleys in science; so long as there are insurmountable differences and 
controversies, there is a chance for cognitive progress. We only hope that 
the volume is a step in this direction. 
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